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Abstract
We develop a tractable equilibrium model for price formation in intraday electricity
markets in the presence of intermittent renewable generation. Using stochastic control
theory we identify the optimal strategies of agents with market impact and exhibit
the Nash equilibrium in closed form for a finite number of agents as well as in the
asymptotic framework of mean field games. Our model reproduces the empirical
features of intraday market prices, such as increasing price volatility at the approach
of the delivery date and the correlation between price and renewable infeed forecasts,
and relates these features with market characteristics like liquidity, number of agents,
and imbalance penalty.
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1 Introduction
The electricity markets around the world are undergoing a major transformation driven
by the transition towards a carbon-free energy system. The increasing penetration of inter-
mittent renewables puts a stronger emphasis on short-term electricity trading and balanc-
ing. The intraday electricity markets are increasingly used by the renewable producers to
compensate forecast errors. This improves market liquidity and at the same time creates
feedback effects of the renewable generation on the market price, leading to increased price
volatility and negative correlations between renewable infeed and prices. These effects
have an adverse impact on the revenues of renewable producers. They are already signif-
icant in countries with high renewable penetration and will become even more important
as new renewable capacity comes online. A better understanding of the impact of inter-
mittent renewable generation on intraday electricity market prices and trading volumes is
therefore needed to ensure the long-term economic sustainability of the renewable energy
production.
In this paper, we build an equilibrium model for the intraday electricity market, aiming
to understand the price formation and identify the optimal strategies for market partici-
pants in the setting where both the strategies of the agents and the demand or generation
forecasts may affect market prices. We consider an intraday electricity market, where the
participants optimize their revenues based on imperfect forecasts of terminal demand or
production. We place ourselves in the standard linear-quadratic setting with quadratic
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trading costs and linear market impact. The actions of each agent therefore impact mar-
ket prices, leading to a stochastic game where players interact through the market price.
We exhibit a closed-form Nash equilibrium for this game, and provide explicit formulas for
the market price and the strategies of the agents under two different settings:
· the setting of N identical agents, having complete information about the forecasts of
the other agents (perfect information),
· the setting of an infinite number of identical small agents (the mean field), where
each agent only observes the aggregate forecast as well as its own forecast (imperfect
information).
We then show by theoretical analysis and through numerical simulations that our model
reproduces the stylized features of the market price, which we document empirically. In
particular,
· the market price becomes more volatile at the approach of the delivery time,
· the market price exhibits negative correlation with the total renewable infeed forecast,
which grows in absolute value at the approach of the delivery time.
Furthermore, our model provides direct quantitative links between market characteristics
and market price features, as well as the gain of individual agents. For instance,
· observed price volatility decreases with market depth (inverse of permanent market
impact),
· price volatility increases for lower instantaneous trading costs, which allow agents to
trade more actively,
· increased competition (greater number of agents in the market) limits profit oppor-
tunities for individual agents and also leads to lower price volatility.
Correlations between renewable infeed and intraday market prices have been studied
empirically by a number of authors. Kiesel and Paraschiv [19] perform an econometric
analysis of the German intraday market and show that a deeper penetration of renewable
energies increases market liquidity and price-infeed correlations. The wind power output
forecast errors thus turn out to be of paramount importance in explaining the price dif-
ferences between the day ahead and intraday prices. Karanfil and Li [18] draw similar
conclusions from an empirical study of the Danish market, and exhibit the impact of re-
newable energies on prices, bid-ask spread and volatility. Gruet, Rowińska and Veraart [24]
establish a negative correlation between the wind energy penetration and the day ahead
market prices. They also show that taking into account wind energy generation improves
goodness of fit in their multifactor model for the German and Austrian day ahead market.
In addition to creating a negative correlation between the renewable infeeds and the spot
prices, Jonsson, Pinson and Madsen [17] show that a deeper penetration of the intermittent
energies modifies significantly the distribution of spot prices.
Optimal strategies in the intraday market for a single wind energy producer have also
been the object of studies both in the price-taker and price-maker context. In the price-
taker setting, Garnier and Madlener [13] solve a discrete-time optimal trading problem
to arbitrate between immediate and delayed trading when price and production forecasts
are uncertain. In [23], Morales, Conejo and Perez-Ruiz consider a multimarket setting
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to derive an optimal bidding strategy for a wind energy producer in the day ahead and
adjustment markets, while minimizing the cost incurred in the balancing market. Discrete
decisions are taken for each delivery period, considering a finite number of probable sce-
narii. This approach has been enhanced by Zugno, Morales, Pinson and Madsen, in [26],
where the wind energy producer is now price maker in the balancing market. Following the
same framework, Delikaraoglou, Papakonstantinou, Ordoudis and Pinson [11] formulate a
problem where the renewable producer is price maker in both the day ahead and balancing
markets and assess the relevance of strategic behaviour in the context of high renewable
penetration and varying flexible capacities. Still in the price-maker setting, continuous-
time approaches have also been developed. Aïd, Gruet and Pham [1], consider the optimal
trading rate and power generation of a thermal producer when the residual demand at the
terminal date is random. In the same trend, Tan and Tankov [25] develop an optimal trad-
ing model for a wind energy producer. They quantify the evolution of forecast incertainty
at the approach of the delivery time, and exhibit optimal strategies depending on forecast
updates.
In our study, the uncertain renewable production is also a source of randomness, and
the producers’ trading decisions impact the market. Unlike the previous papers, we con-
sider the equilibrium setting with many agents and determine the market price as the result
of their interaction. Explicit results for dynamic equilibria are often difficult to obtain. In
particular, Nash equilibria often lead to systems of coupled partial differential equations.
However, the linear-quadratic setting proposed by Bouchard et al. [7], allows to find ana-
lytic solutions in the case of perfect information. In the imperfect information setting, the
problem may be simplified by assuming a continuum of agents and using the mean field
game approach.
The mean field games are stochastic differential games with a large number of symmet-
ric agents, which were originally studied by Lasry and Lions [22] and Huang, Caines, and
Malhamé [15]. The equilibrium of such a game is characterized through a coupled system
of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and a Fokker-Planck equation. Carmona and Delarue [9]
proposed an alternative way to formalize the system inspired by the Pontryagin principle
and relating the mean field game solution to a McKean-Vlasov Forward Backward Stochas-
tic Differential Equation (FBSDE). From the mean field game solution one can derive an
ε-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding N -player game (ε-Nash MFG). In an alternative
approach, Lacker [21], worked on limiting properties of N -player games and proved in some
cases the convergence of N -player Nash equilibria to weak mean field Equilibria (MFE).
Financial markets and energy systems with many small interacting agents are a natural
domain of applications of MFG. Alasseur, Tahar and Matoussi [2] develop a model for the
optimal management of energy storage and distribution in a smart grid system through an
extended MFG. Casgrain and Jaimungal [10] recently applied the MFG theory to optimal
trade execution with price impact and terminal inventory liquidation condition. They used
the extended mean field setting to deal with incomplete information and heterogeneous
sub-populations of agents.
As in [10], we distinguish between private state variables of the agents and the com-
mon information shared by all participants in the market. Unlike [10], the final trading
constraint in our paper is given by the stochastic production / demand forecast rather
than by an inventory liquidation condition. From the mathematical point of view, linear
quadratic mean-field games have been studied, e.g., in [5] in the diffusion setting. While
our approach is naturally less general in terms of model specification since we focus on
a specific model for the electricity market, it is more general in terms of the underlying
information structure, since we allow a fully general adapted square integrable process for
the fundamental price and general square integrable martingales for the forecast processes.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the market and introduces some
notions common for both settings considered in the paper. In section 3 we place ourselves
in a complete information setting with a finite number of agents, where all agents observe
the forecasts of the other agents. In section 4 we assume that the agents do not observe each
other’s individual demand forecasts. This leads to an incomplete information setting in
which the N -player equilibrium is intractable. We therefore consider the associated mean
field game. To make a connection between the N -agent setting and the mean-field game
setting, we show in section 5 that (i) the N -player equilibrium converges to the mean-field
equilibrium as N → ∞, and (ii) an ε-Nash equilibrium for the N -player problem may be
constructed from the mean-field equilibrium. In section 6 we perform empirical analysis
of intraday market and confront it to the theoretical results obtained in the preceding
sections.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we consider a unique class of agents: the small market participants with
identical characteristics. These agents are assumed to have taken a position in the day
ahead market, and use the intraday market to manage the volume risk associated to the
imperfect production /demand forecast used for their day ahead market bid. While our
primary interest is to study the impact of increasing renewable penetration on intraday
market prices, the market participants may in principle represent both renewable producers
with uncertain generation forecasts and industrial consumers with uncertain demand. To
simplify the language and notation, in the sequel, unless specified otherwise, we will refer
to forecasts of all agents as demand forecasts. These forecasts represent the best estimate
of the additional demand compared to the position taken by the agent in the spot market:
if the agent is expected to produce less, or consume more than the day ahead position, the
forecast is positive. To avoid paying the imbalance penalties, the position taken by the
agent in the intraday market by the delivery date must therefore be equal to the realized
demand.
Throughout the paper we place ourselves in the intraday market for a given delivery
hour starting at time T , where time 0 corresponds to the opening time of the market (in
EPEX Intraday this happens at 3PM on the previous day). In reality, trading stops a
few minutes before delivery time (e.g. 5 minutes for Germany). However, for the sake of
simplicity we assume that market participants can trade during the entire period [0, T ],
and that the last observed value of the demand forecast equals the realized demand.
3 A finite number of agents with complete information
In this section we assume that in the market there areN identical agents, and we denote
by φit the position of i-th agent at time t. As is common in optimal execution literature, we
assume that the position of i-th agent is an absolutely continuous process, and we define
the rate of trading φ˙it. We introduce a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P)
to which all processes are adapted, and which models the information available in the
market to all the agents. Without loss of generality, we assume that φi0 = 0 for all i so
that the position of the i-th agent at time t is given by φit =
∫ t
0 φ˙
i
sds. As the agents’
strategies may impact the market price, we distinguish the price without price impact or
fundamental price (St)t∈[0,T ] from the market price (PNt )t∈[0,T ], where the market impact
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is included. The strategies impact the market price PNt as follows:
PNt = St + aφ¯
N
t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
where φ¯Nt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 φ
i
t is the average position of the agents and a is a constant. The
parameter N describes the size of the market (number of agents), it is therefore natural
that the trading strategy of each agent has an effect of order of 1/N on the market price.
The permanent component of the price impact of trades in our model is thus linear, which
is the only shape compatible with the absence of arbitrage, see [16, 14]. On the other hand,
the transient component of market impact is not modelled directly. Literature on market
microstructure mostly shows that metaorders have a concave transient impact on prices
(see Bershova and Rakhlin [6], Bacry et al. [4], and Bouchaud [8]). However, for the sake of
simplicity and in order to provide an analytical solution for our model, we choose a linear
impact function as in the seminal paper by Almgren and Chriss [3] and more recently in
Aïd et al. [1], and the transient component of the market impact is taken into account
indirectly, via a trading cost penalty.
The agents trading in the market at time t incur an instantaneous cost,
φ˙itP
N
t +
α(t)
2
(φ˙it)
2, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
for the i-th agent. Here the first term represents the actual cost of buying the electricity,
and the second term represents the cost of trading, where α(.) is a continuous strictly
positive function on [0, T ] reflecting the variation of market liquidity at the approach of
the delivery date. The instantaneous cost paid by each agent is thus independent of the
size of the market. This corresponds to a market where immediately available liquidity
(market depth) is low (thus even a minor agent has to pay order book costs) but the order
book is resilient (thus the trade of a minor agent only has a lasting impact of order of
1/N on the price). This is consistent with recent empirical and theoretical studies of order
book dynamics, for example, according to [12], while the total daily volume exchange on
a typical stock is around 1/200th of its market capitalisation, the volume present in the
order book at any instant in time is 1000 times smaller than this.
Each agent i has a demand forecast Xit and aims to maximise her gain from trading
in the market under the volume constraint φiT = X
i
T , where X
i
T represents the difference
between the actual realized demand and the position in the day ahead market, which must
be compensated with the position in the intraday market. This constraint may be enforced
as a hard constraint or as a penalty. The penalty formulation may be more realistic since
in practice when there is a mismatch between the realized demand and the aggregate
positions taken in the market, the agents pay a penalty based on the imbalance price.
The processes S and (Xi)Ni=1 satisfy the following assumption. In this assumption and
below, we say that the process ξ is square integrable if E
[∫ T
0 ξ
2
t dt
]
<∞.
Assumption 1. The process S is F-adapted and square integrable, and the processes
(Xi)Ni=1 are square integrable F-martingales.
Considering the demand forecast as a martingale is natural since it is the best estimate
at time t of what the demand will be at the delivery time T given our current knowledge
Ft.
We say that the strategy (φ˙it)t∈[0,T ] of the ith agent is admissible if it is F-adapted and
square integrable.
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Each agent wishes to maximize the objective function
JN,i(φi, φ−i) := −E
[∫ T
0
{
α(t)
2
(φ˙it)
2 + φ˙itP
N
t
}
dt+
λ
2
(φiT −XiT )2
]
, (2)
where λ is the strength of the imbalance penalty and φ−i := (φ1, . . . , φi−1, φi+1, . . . , φN ) is
the vector of positions of all agents except the ith one. Remark that to simplify notation,
we write the objective function in terms of agents’ positions φi rather than their trading
strategies φ˙i.
Because of the price impact, each agent’s gain is affected by the decisions of others and
we thus face a non-cooperative game. The optimal strategy of each player depends on the
other players’ actions and we want to describe the resulting dynamical equilibrium, which
we define formally below.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). We say that ( ˙φi∗t )i=1...Nt∈[0,T ] is a Nash Equilibrium for the
N-player game if it is a vector of admissible strategies, and for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗) ≤ JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗) (3)
for any other admissible strategy φ˙i of player i in the market.
In other words, in the situation of Nash equilibrium, the strategy φ˙i∗ used by each
agent is this agent’s best response to the strategies φ˙−i∗ of all other agents.
The following theorem characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the N -player game. In
the theorem and its proof, we denote the average forecast process by XNt :=
1
N
∑N
i=1X
i
t
and use the following shorthand notation.
∆Ns,t :=
∫ t
s
ηNu,t
α(u)
du with ηNs,t = e
− ∫ ts (N−1)aNα(u) du
∆˜s,t :=
∫ t
s
η˜Nu,t
α(u)
du, with η˜Ns,t = e
∫ t
s
a
Nα(u)du
INt :=
∫ t
0
ηNs,t
α(s)
Ssds, I˜
N
t := E
[∫ T
0
ηNs,T
α(s)
Ssds
∣∣∣Ft] . (4)
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, the unique Nash equilibrium in the complete informa-
tion N -player game is given by
φi∗t = −INt + ∆N0,t
(
a
N + λ
)
I˜N0 + λX
N
0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
(
a
N + λ
)
dI˜Ns + λdX
N
s
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆Ns,T
+
∫ t
0
∆˜s,t
λd(Xis −XNs )
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆˜s,T
+ ∆˜0,t
λ(Xi0 −XN0 )
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆˜0,T
.
(5)
The equilibrium price has the following shape:
PNt = St − aINt + a∆N0,t
(
a
N + λ
)
I˜N0 + λX
N
0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
+ a
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
(
a
N + λ
)
dI˜Ns + λdX
N
s
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆Ns,T
. (6)
Proof. Step 1. First order condition of optimality for a single agent. In this step, we are
going to show that for fixed φ−i∗, the strategy φi∗ satisfies (3) if and only if there exists a
square integrable F-martingale Y i such that, almost surely,
Y it + α(t)φ˙
i∗
t + St + aφ¯
N∗
t −
a
N
φi∗t = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and Y iT =
a
N
φi∗T + λ(φ
i∗
T −XiT ). (7)
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Assume that φi∗ satisfies (3). Then, for any adapted square integrable process (νt)0≤t≤T ,
JN,i(φi∗ +
∫ ·
0
νsds, φ
−i∗) ≤ JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗).
Developing the expressions, this is equivalent to
E
[
1
2
∫ T
0
α(t)ν2t dt+
(
a
N
+
λ
2
)(∫ T
0
νtdt
)2]
+ E
[∫ T
0
νt
{
α(t)φ˙i∗t + St + aφ¯
N∗
t −
a
N
φi∗t
}
dt+
( a
N
φi∗T + λ(φ
i∗
T −XiT )
)∫ T
0
νtdt
]
≥ 0,
and since ν is arbitrary, we see that optimality is equivalent to
E
[∫ T
0
νt
{
α(t)φ˙i∗t + St + aφ¯
N∗
t −
a
N
φi∗t
}
dt+
( a
N
φi∗T + λ(φ
i∗
T −XiT )
)∫ T
0
νtdt
]
= 0, (8)
for any adapted square integrable ν. Now, assume that Y i is a square integrable martingale
satisfying (7). Then, by integration by parts, the expression in the previous line equals
E
[
−
∫ T
0
νtYtdt+ YT
∫ T
0
νtdt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
νsds
)
dYt
]
= 0,
and we see that the optimality condition is satisfied. Conversely, assume that (8) is satisfied
for any adapted square integrable process ν, and let Y i be a martingale such that
Y iT =
a
N
φi∗T + λ(φ
i∗
T −XiT ).
Then, by integration by parts, (8) is equivalent to
E
[∫ T
0
νt
{
α(t)φ˙i∗t + St + aφ¯
N∗
t −
a
N
φi∗t + Y
i
t
}
dt
]
= 0,
and since ν is arbitrary, we see that (7) is satisfied.
Step 2. Computing the average position. Let (φi∗)i=1,...,N be a Nash equilibrium. We
have seen that this is equivalent to (7) for i = 1, . . . , N . Summing up these expressions for
i = 1, . . . , N and denoting Y Nt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Y
i
t , we get
Y
N
t + α(t)
˙¯φN∗t + St + a
N − 1
N
φ¯N∗t = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and Y NT =
a
N
φ¯N∗T + λ(φ¯
N∗
T −XNT ).
The first equation can be solved explicitly for φ¯N∗:
φ¯N∗t = −
∫ t
0
ηN (s, t)
Y
N
s + Ss
α(s)
ds. (9)
Denoting φˆt := φ¯N∗t + INt , we obtain simplified equations:
φˆt = −
∫ t
0
ηN (s, t)
Y
N
s
α(s)
ds, Y
N
T = (
a
N
+ λ)φˆT − ( a
N
+ λ)INT − λXNT .
Substituting φˆT into the second equation and taking the expectation, we obtain another
linear equation, this time for Y Nt :
Y
N
T = −(
a
N
+ λ)
∫ T
0
ηN (s, T )
Y
N
s
α(s)
ds− ( a
N
+ λ)IT − λXNT .
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Y
N
t = −
( a
N
+ λ
)∫ t
0
Y
N
s
ηN (s, T )
α(s)
ds−
( a
N
+ λ
)
∆Nt,TY
N
t −
( a
N
+ λ
)
E[INT |Ft]− λXNt .
By integration by parts, this is equivalent to
Y
N
t = −
( a
N
+ λ
)∫ t
0
∆Ns,TdY
N
s −
( a
N
+ λ
)
∆N0,TY
N
0 −
( a
N
+ λ
)
E[INT |Ft]− λXNt .
Taking t = 0, we get:
Y
N
0 =
− ( aN + λ)E[INT |F0]− λXN0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
On the other hand, in differential form,{
1 +
( a
N
+ λ
)
∆Nt,T
}
dY
N
t = −
( a
N
+ λ
)
dE[INT |Ft]− λdXNt ,
which is solved therefore explicitly by
Y
N
t =
− ( aN + λ)E[INT |F0]− λXN0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
−
∫ t
0
(
a
N + λ
)
dE[INT |Fs] + λdX
N
s
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆Ns,T
(10)
Finally
φ¯N∗t = −INt +
∫ t
0
Y
N
s d∆
N
s,t = −INt − Y N0 ∆N0,t −
∫ t
0
∆Ns,tdY
N
s
= −INt + ∆N0,t
(
a
N + λ
)
E[INT |F0] + λX
N
0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
(
a
N + λ
)
dE[INT |Fs] + λdX
N
s
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆Ns,T
.
(11)
Step 3: computing the position of the agent. Let φˇi∗t := φi∗t − φ¯N∗t , Xˇit = Xit −XNt and
Yˇ it := Y
i
t − Y Nt . Then, Yˇ i is an F-martingale and satisfies
Yˇ iT =
a
N
φˇi∗T + λ(φˇ
i∗
T − XˇiT ), Yˇ it = −α(t) ˙ˇφi∗t +
a
N
φˇi∗t .
Similarly to the second part, this system admits an explicit solution:
Yˇ it = −
λXˇi0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆˜0,T
−
∫ t
0
λdXˇis
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆˜s,T
.
and
φˇi∗t =
∫ t
0
∆˜s,t
λdXˇis
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆˜s,T
+ ∆˜0,t
λXˇi0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆˜0,T
.
Let us take a closer look at the average strategy
φ¯Nt = −INt + ∆N0,t
(
a
N + λ
)
I˜N0 + λX
N
0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
(
a
N + λ
)
dI˜Ns + λdX
N
s
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆Ns,T
,
which also corresponds, up to the coefficient a, to the market impact component of the
price. It is a linear combination of components depending on the average forecast process
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X
N , and those depending on the fundamental price S, reflecting the conflicting objectives
of the agents to limit the loss due to the terminal penalty and increase the gain from
trading. To better understand the structure and behavior of the average strategy and the
market impact process, the following corollary derives its shape under several simplifying
assumptions and limiting cases.
Corollary 4.
i. When the fundamental price process S is a martingale, the average strategy satisfies,
φ¯Nt = ∆
N
0,t
−S0 + λXN0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆N0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
−dSs + λdXNs
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆Ns,T
.
ii. In the limit of zero trading costs (when α(t)→ 0 uniformly on t ∈ [0, T ]), the average
strategy satisfies,
φ¯Nt
||α||∞→0−−−−−−→ λ
a+ λ
X
N
t −
St
a
+
E[ST |Ft]− St
a(N − 1) +
λE[ST |Ft]
a(a+ λ)
, (12)
almost surely for every t ∈ [0, T ]. When the fundamental price process S is a mar-
tingale, in the limit of zero trading costs, the average strategy satisfies,
φ¯Nt
||α||∞→0−−−−−−→ λ
a+ λ
X
N
t −
St
a+ λ
, (13)
almost surely for every t ∈ [0, T ].
iii. In the limit of infinite terminal penalty (when λ→∞), the average strategy satisfies,
lim
λ−→∞
φ¯Nt = −INt +
∆N0,t
∆N0,T
(
I˜N0 +X
N
0
)
+
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
∆Ns,T
(
dI˜Ns + dX
N
s
)
, (14)
almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ]. When the fundamental price process S is a martingale,
in the limit of infinite terminal penalty (when λ→∞), the average strategy does not
depend on the fundamental price and satisfies,
φ¯Nt = X
N
0
∆N0,t
∆N0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆Ns,t
∆Ns,T
dX
N
s , (15)
almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ].
iv. In the absence of terminal penalty, the average strategy satisfies
φ¯Nt = −INt +
a
N
∆N0,tI˜
N
0
1 + aN∆
N
0,T
+
a
N
∫ t
0
∆Ns,tdI˜
N
s
1 + aN∆
N
s,T
, (16)
almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof.
Part i. From the expressions of IN and I˜N in (4), by integration by parts under the
martingale condition, we derive:
INt = −
∫ t
0
Ssd∆
N
s,t = ∆
N
0,tS0 +
∫ t
0
∆Ns,tdSs
I˜Ns =
∫ t
0
ηN (s, T )
α(s)
Ssds+ St
∫ T
t
ηN (s, T )
α(s)
ds = S0∆
N
0,T +
∫ t
0
∆Ns,TdSs.
Substituting these expressions into the general formula for φ¯Nt , we obtain the result.
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Part ii. Fixing s < t ∈ [0, T ], we have:
∆Ns,t =
N
a(N − 1)
(
1− e−
∫ t
s
a(N−1)
α(l)N
dl
)
−→ N
a(N − 1) := ∆
∗
as α(t) → 0 uniformly in t. Moreover, this limit does not depend on s, and the principal
contribution is made at the right end-point of the integral. Since the fundamental price
process S is a.s., continuous, it is easy to see that INt → ∆∗St almost surely, for every t.
For similar reasons, using the dominated convergence theorem, I˜Nt → ∆∗E[ST |Ft]. Finally,
lim
‖α‖→0
φ¯Nt = −∆∗St +
∆∗
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆∗
(
λX
N
t +
( a
N
+ λ
)
∆∗E[ST |Ft]
)
=
λ
a+ λ
X
N
t −
N
a(N − 1)St +
a
N + λ
a+ λ
N
a(N − 1)E[ST |Ft]
Part iii. Both formulas follow by integration by parts and dominated convergence.
Part iv. This follows by direct substitution of λ = 0 into the general formula.
The term IN , which depends on the past values of the fundamental price can be seen as
a "myopic" component of the strategy, while the term I˜N , which depends on the expected
future prices, may be seen as a "forward-looking" component, which takes into account the
future loss from paying the penalty and the potential future profits from trading. As seen
from equation (16), this forward-looking term is also present in the absence of penalty,
however it is only present insofar as the agent can interact strategically with the other
agents. When the number of agents tends to infinity, the potential for strategic interaction
diminishes, and the forward-looking part of the strategy disappears from the formula.
In addition, from (9), we notice that for nonzero trading costs, the price impact has
a finite variation. Hence, it does not directly induce additional volatility which may be
a weakness of the model. However, the drift ˙¯φN is stochastic and thus creates additional
price variations, which makes the effective observed volatility larger. We will investigate
this phenomenon in more details in the following paragraph.
Another interesting phenomenon is that in the absence of trading costs, for N ≥ 2, the
aggregate equilibrium strategy and the individual strategies of the agents are well defined
and the gain of each agent remains bounded in expectation. This is in contrast with the
single-agent case, where the gain may be arbitrarily large, unless the fundamental price
process is a martingale. Indeed, in the single-agent case, without transaction costs the
objective function writes:
J1,i(φ) = −E
[∫ T
0
φ˙t(St + aφt)dt+
λ
2
(XT − φT )2
]
= E
[∫ T
0
φtdSt − φTST − a
2
φ2T −
λ
2
(XT − φT )2
]
,
and it is clear that in the non-martingale case, this expression can be made arbitrarily
large. This means that the "price of anarchy" in this model is infinite: if the agents chose
the same strategy they could have all obtained an infinite gain, but competition between
agents limits everybody’s gain to a finite value.
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3.1 Trading costs, volatility and correlation
In this section, we analyze the effect of market structure (number of participants, ter-
minal penalty, trading costs and market impact) on the overall costs/gains of participants
as well as on the aggregate market parameters such as price volatility and correlation be-
tween forecast and price. To simplify the computations, we make the following additional
assumptions.
· The fundamental price process S is a martingale with 〈S〉t = σ2St.
· The trading cost parameter α is constant.
· The forecast processes of agents satisfy
〈XN 〉t = σ2Xt, 〈Xˇi〉t = σˇ2Xt, and 〈XN , Xˇi〉t = 0 ∀ i,
for some constants σX and σˇX , where Xˇit = Xit −XNt .
Under these assumptions, the coefficients ηNs,t and ∆s,t depend only on t − s and not on
s and t separately. We shall therefore write them as ηNt−s and ∆Nt−s, and similarly for the
other coefficients, from now and until the end of this section. The aggregate position of N
agents in equilibrium therefore writes:
φ¯Nt = ∆
N
t
−S0 + λXN0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆NT
+
∫ t
0
∆Nt−s
−dSs + λdXNs
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆NT−s
.
Volatility We have seen that since the strategy φ¯N is differentiable, the quadratic varia-
tion of the equilibrium price PNt coincides with the quadratic variation of the fundamental
price. However, the actual observed volatility, which is estimated from discretely observed
prices, may be larger. Since the market impact component of the price is given by aφ¯Nt ,
we may use the expectation of the squared derivative of the aggregate strategy, E[( ˙¯φNt )2],
as a measure of variability of the aggregate strategy, and thus as a proxy for the additional
variance of the equilibrium price. In this section we draw conclusions about the behavior
of price volatility by analyzing this proxy, and in Section 6 we will show in numerical ex-
amples that the actual volatility, estimated from discrete observations of simulated market
price exhibits similar behavior. Under the assumption of this section, this gives:
˙¯φNt =
ηNt
α
−S0 + λXN0
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆NT
+
∫ t
0
ηNt−s
α
−dSs + λdXNs
1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆NT−s
.
E[( ˙¯φNt )2] =
(ηNt )
2
α2
(S0 − λXN0 )2
(1 +
(
a
N + λ
)
∆NT )
2
+
σ2S + λ
2σ2X
α2
∫ t
0
(ηNt−s)2
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T−s)2
ds. (17)
The function of interest t 7→ E[( ˙¯φNt )2] has thus two parts: the first one is due to the
deterministic components of the aggregate strategy, and it decreases with t, and the second
one is due to the volatility of the fundamental price and the aggregate forecast, and it
increases with t. We expect the second part to dominate the first one close to delivery
since the initial state of the market should not play a role at this time. As a result, the
variability of the aggregate strategy (and thus, the observed price volatility) increases at
the approach of the delivery date in our model, a phenomenon, which we also document
empirically in section 6.
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Recall that in our context,
ηNT = e
− (N−1)a
Nα
T , and ∆NT =
N
(N − 1)a(1− e
− (N−1)a
Nα
T )
From the expression (17), one may deduce several interesting limiting regimes for the extra
variance of the equilibrium price:
· Small liquidity cost regime: α → 0. For 0 < t < T , ∆Nt−s → N(N−1)a uniformly on
s ∈ [0, t], so that,
E[( ˙¯φNt )2] ∼
σ2S + λ
2σ2X
α
N
2(N − 1)a, α→ 0.
As the market impact is given by aφ¯Nt , this shows that the extra variance of the
equilibrium price grows like aα . We recall that the parameter α represents the trading
costs while the parameter a reflects the strength of the permanent market impact
directly related to the market depth. Both can be interpreted as liquidity signals
but lead to distinct market effects. Decreasing transaction costs allows the agents
to follow the forecasts more closely, leading to a higher volatility of the aggregate
position and of the market price. On the contrary, when a decreases, the market
impact of agents is weaker and so are the price variations. As a consequence, the
volatility decreases too.
On the other hand, since the function N 7→ NN−1 is decreasing in N , we conclude
that price volatility in the small liquidity cost regime is decreasing with the number
of agents: in our model, competition between agents increases market frictions and
leads to reduced volatility.
· Large liquidity costs regime: α → ∞. In this case, ∆NT ∼ Tα and the extra variance
decays like 1
α2
:
E[( ˙¯φNT )2] ∼
(S0 − λXN0 )2
α2
+
σ2S + λ
2σ2X
α2
T
Higher liquidity costs decrease the trading rate of agents and lead to a lower overall
market volatility.
· Large penalty limit: λ→∞. In this case, the extra variance grows like λ:
E[( ˙¯φNT )2] ∼
λ
α
σ2X .
Higher imbalance penalties force the agents to follow the forecasts more closely and
lead to an overall higher price volatility.
Covariance To understand how the forecast updates influence prices, we compute the
covariance of the increment of the aggregate strategy over an interval of length h with the
increment of the aggregate forecast over the same interval. Using the explicit form of the
strategy, we easily obtain,
Cov[φ¯Nt+h − φ¯Nt , XNt+h −XNt ] = λ(σNX )2
∫ t+h
t
∆Nt+h−s
1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T−s
ds.
From this expression, we conclude that the covariance of equilibrium price with forecast
updates increases when the terminal penalty λ increases, and when the time t approaches
the delivery date .
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Trading costs As our final illustration in this section, we evaluate the total expected
gain/cost of the agents and elucidate the effect of various market parameters on this gain.
The total gain/cost for the ith agent in our present context is given by
JN,i(φi, φ−i) = −E
[∫ T
0
{α
2
(φ˙it)
2 + φ˙itP
N
t
}
dt+
λ
2
(φiT −XiT )2
]
= −E
[
α
2
∫ T
0
( ˙¯φNt )
2dt+ ST φ¯
N
T +
a
2
(φ¯NT )
2 +
λ
2
(φ¯NT −XNT )2
]
− E
[
α
2
∫ T
0
( ˙ˇφit)
2dt+
λ
2
(φˇiT − XˇiT )2
]
= −E
α
2
∫ T
0
( ˙¯φNt )
2dt+
a+ λ
2
(
φ¯NT −
λX
N
T − ST
a+ λ
)2− λ
2
E[(XNT )2]
+
E[(λXNT − ST )2]
2(a+ λ)
− E
[
α
2
∫ T
0
( ˙ˇφit)
2dt+
λ
2
(φˇiT − XˇiT )2
]
= −E
[
α
2
∫ T
0
( ˙¯φNt )
2dt+
α2
2(a+ λ)
(
˙¯φNT
)2]− λ
2
E[(XNT )2] +
E[(λXNT − ST )2]
2(a+ λ)
− E
[
α
2
∫ T
0
( ˙ˇφit)
2dt+
α2
2λ
( ˙ˇφiT )
2
]
In the present context,
E[( ˙¯φNT )2] =
(ηNT )
2E[(S0 − λXN0 )2]
α2(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T )
2
+
∫ T
0
(ηNT−t)
2(σ2S + λ
2σ2X)
α2(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T−t)2
dt
=
(ηNT )
2E[(S0 − λXN0 )2]
α2(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T )
2
+
σ2S + λ
2σ2X
α
∫ ∆NT
0
(1− aN (N − 1)u)
(1 + ( aN + λ)u)
2
du
E[( ˙ˇφiT )2] =
λ2(η˜NT )
2E[(Xˇi0)2]
α2(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
T )
2
+
∫ T
0
λ2(η˜NT−t)
2σˇ2X
α2(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
T−t)2
dt
=
λ2(η˜NT )
2E[(Xˇi0)2]
α2(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
T )
2
+
λ2σˇ2X
α
∫ ∆˜NT
0
1 + aN u
(1 + ( aN + λ)u)
2
ds
∫ T
0
E[( ˙¯φNt )2]dt =
1
2
(1 + ηNT )∆
N
T E[(S0 − λX
N
0 )
2]
α(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T )
2
+
σ2S + λ
2σ2X
2α
∫ T
0
dt
(1 + ηNT−t)∆
N
T−t
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T−t)2∫ T
0
E[( ˙ˇφit)2]dt =
1
2
λ2(η˜NT + 1)∆˜
N
T E[(Xˇi0)2]
α(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
T )
2
+
λ2σˇ2X
2α
∫ T
0
dt
(η˜NT−t + 1)∆˜
N
T−t
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
T−t)2
Given the complexity of these expressions, we once again consider the limiting regimes
of small liquidity costs, large liquidity costs and large imbalance penalty.
· In the case of small liquidity costs, α→ 0,
JN,i(φi, φ−i)→− 1
4
∆N∞E[(ST − λXNT )2]
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N∞)2
− λNE[(Xˇ
i
T )
2]
2( aN + λ)
2a
(
N
a
+
λ
2
)
+
E[(λXNT − ST )2]
2(a+ λ)
− λ
2
E[(XNT )2],
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with ∆N∞ =
N
a(N−1) . Thus, for small liquidity costs, the gain of an agent converges
to a finite constant. As the cost per trade decreases, the agents trade more actively
so that the overall cost does not decrease as much. For a market with a single agent
(N = 1), both terms in the first line are zero. On the other hand, when N is large,
both the first term in the first line is nonzero, and the last term in the first line grows
proportionally to N2. We conclude that due to competition between agents, the cost
of each individual agent increases as N →∞.
· In the case of large liquidity costs, α→∞,
JN,i(φi, φ−i)→ −λ
2
E[(XˇiT )2]−
λ
2
E[(XNT )2],
which corresponds to the cost of the ’do nothing’ strategy.
· In the case of large terminal penalty λ, the leading term of the single agent’s cost is
given by
JN,i(φi, φ−i) ∼ −σ
2
X
4
∫ T
0
dt
λ2(1 + ηNT−t)∆
N
t
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
T−t)2
− σˇ
2
X
4
∫ T
0
dt
λ2(η˜NT−t + 1)∆˜
N
T−t
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
T−t)2
∼ −ασ
2
X
2
∫ ( a
N
+λ)∆NT
0
dt
udu
(1 + u)2
− ασˇ
2
X
2
∫ ( a
N
+λ)∆˜NT
0
dt
udu
(1 + u)2
∼ −ασ
2
X
2
log
(
1 + (
a
N
+ λ)∆NT
)
− ασˇ
2
X
2
log
(
1 + (
a
N
+ λ)∆˜NT
)
∼ −α(σ
2
X + σˇ
2
X)
2
log λ.
Thus, when the terminal penalty grows, the single agent cost tends to +∞ at a
logarithmic rate.
Up to now, we considered that all players have access to the common filtration F. In
Theorem 3, the optimal strategy of each agent depends on the demand forecast of the other
players. However, one could argue that in practice the agents do not observe the individual
forecasts of one another, and their strategy may only be based on their own information,
and on the market price, which depends via the price impact on the aggregate forecast
of all the players. In addition, strategic considerations may push the players to change
their strategies in order to avoid disclosing information to the market. The problem of
determining the Nash equilibrium in this partial information setting thus becomes very
complex. These considerations motivate us to consider the partial information problem in
the mean field setting, where the role of each individual player is negligible and strategic
considerations do not play a role.
4 A mean-field game with incomplete information
In this section we consider that the information available to agents is no longer the same.
We directly place ourselves in the mean field game limit, that is, we assume the number of
agents in the market, N tends to infinity, while the strategy of each agent remains finite.
We then consider a generic agent and denote by X := (Xt)t∈[0,T ] the demand forecast of
this agent, by φ the agent’s position and by F the filtration which contains the information
available to this agent. In addition we introduce a smaller filtration, containing the common
noise and denoted by F0. This filtration contains the information about the fundamental
price and potentially some information about the demand forecast but, in general, not the
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full individual demand forecast of the generic agent. In the following we decompose the
individual demand forecast as follows: Xt = Xt+Xˇt, where Xt = E
[
Xt|F0t
]
is common for
all agents (it can be seen as a national demand forecast). In this mean field game setting,
the average quantities of the N -agent problem are replaced with conditional expectations
with respect to the common noise filtration F0.
Throughout the paper and for any F-adapted process (ζt)t∈[0,T ], we will denote ζ¯t =
E[ζt|F0t ] =
∫
R xµ
ζ
t (dx) where: µ
ζ
t := L(ζt|F0t ). The game is now represented by the
interaction of agents through the conditional distribution flow µφt := L(φt|F0t ) of the state
process. The price impact function, defined in the previous section as an expectation with
respect to the empirical measure, is now an integral with respect to the measure flow:
Pt = St + aφ¯t. (18)
Each individual agent now has a negligible impact on the price, but the aggregate position
of all agents has a nonzero impact. Thus, in the mean-field game setting, we consider that
the market is very large compared to the size of the individual agent, but the immediately
available liquidity in the order book is small, so that even a minor agent pays a non-zero
trading cost.
The objective function for the generic agent is
JMF (φ, φ¯) := −E
[∫ T
0
α(t)
2
φ˙2t + φ˙t(St + aφ¯t)dt+
λ
2
(φT −XT )2
]
. (19)
As in the previous section, this is maximized over the set of admissible strategies (φ˙t)t∈[0,T ],
which contains all F-adapted square integrable strategies.
We now define the mean field equilibrium.
Definition 5 (mean field equilibrium). An admissible strategy φ˙∗ := (φ˙∗t )t∈[0,T ] is a mean
field equilibrium if it maximizes (19) and φ¯ = φ¯∗.
In this section, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 6.
· The process S is square integrable and adapted to the filtration F0.
· The process X is a square integrable martingale with respect to the filtration F.
· The process X defined by Xt := E[Xt|F0t ] for 0 ≤ t ≤ T is a square integrable
martingale with respect to the filtration F.
Note that if X is an F-martingale, then X is by construction an F0-martingale, but it
may not necessarily be a martingale in the larger filtration F.
The following theorem characterizes the mean field equilibrium in our setting. The
statement of the theorem appears similar to that of Theorem 3, modulo replacing XN
with X and making N tend to infinity. Thus the main implications of Theorem 3, given
in Corollary 4 and section 3.1, hold true also in this case, except, of course for the ones
which describe the behavior of the market price as the number of agents tends to infinity.
However, the form of the strategy and the market price given in this theorem does not
require the knowledge of the individual forecasts of the other players, but only of the
common one. Thus, the theoretical price given by this theorem can be computed by the
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regulator, and the strategy of this theorem can be computed by an individual player, which
do not have the complete information about the forecasts of other players.
In the theorem and its proof, we use the following shorthand notation.
∆s,t :=
∫ t
s
ηu,t
α(u)
du with ηs,t = e
− ∫ ts aα(u)du and ∆˜s,t :=
∫ t
s
α−1(u)du
It :=
∫ t
0
ηs,t
α(s)
Ssds, I˜t := E
[∫ T
0
ηs,T
α(s)
Ssds
∣∣∣Ft] . (20)
Theorem 7. Under Assumption 6, the unique mean field equilibrium is given by
φ∗t = −It + λ
[
∆0,t
I˜0 +X0
1 + λ∆0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆s,t
dI˜s + dXs
1 + λ∆s,T
(21)
+∆˜0,t
Xˇ0
1 + λ∆˜0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆˜s,t
dXˇs
1 + λ∆˜s,T
]
.
The equilibrium price has the following shape:
Pt = St − aIt + aλ
[
∆0,t
I˜0 +X0
1 + λ∆0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆s,t
dI˜s + dXs
1 + λ∆s,T
]
. (22)
Proof. Step 1. First order condition for optimality for a single agent. In this step, we show
that for fixed φ¯∗, the strategy φ∗ maximizes (19) in Definition 5 if and only if there exists
a square integrable F-martingale Y such that, almost surely,
Yt + α(t)φ˙
∗
t + St + aφ¯
∗
t = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and YT = λ(φ∗T −XT ). (23)
The proof follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 3, step 1.
Step 2. Computing the mean field. Let φ∗ be the optimal position of the agent. We
have seen that this is equivalent to (23). Taking the conditional expectation of these
expressions with respect to F0t (and using the overline notation to denote F0-conditional
expectations),
Y t + α(t)
˙¯φ∗t + St + aφ¯
∗
t = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and Y T = λ(φ¯∗T −XT ).
S is adapted to the filtration F0 and by construction, X and Y are F0-martingales. Hence
these equations may be solved along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3, step 2, and we
obtain
Y t =
−λE[IT |F0]− λX0
1 + λ∆0,T
−
∫ t
0
λdE[IT |Fs] + λdXs
1 + λ∆s,T
Step 3: Computing the position of the agent. Let φˇ∗t := φ∗t − φ¯∗t , Xˇt = Xt − Xt and
Yˇt := Yt − Y t. Then, from the explicit form of Y computed in step 2 and our assumption
it follows that Yˇ is an F-martingale and satisfies
YˇT = λ(φˇ
∗
T − XˇT ), Yˇt = −α(t) ˙ˇφ∗t .
This system admits an explicit solution:
Yˇt = − λXˇ0
1 + λ∆˜0,T
−
∫ t
0
λdXˇs
1 + λ∆˜s,T
.
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and
φˇ∗t =
∫ t
0
∆˜s,t
λdXˇs
1 + λ∆˜s,T
+ ∆˜0,t
λXˇ0
1 + λ∆˜0,T
.
Moreover, E[φˇ∗t |F0t ] = 0, hence E[φ∗t |F0t ] = φ¯∗t , so the optimal strategy of the agent is the
mean field equilibrium.
5 On convergence and approximations
In this section, we study the relationship between the equilibrium strategies and prices
in the N -agent market and those of the mean field game limit, and prove the following
results.
· The market price and the agent’s strategy in the N -agent model converge to their
respective mean field values as N →∞. This shows that to understand the behavior
of agents and prices in the realistic N -agent market, one can use the mean-field game
model, which does not require the knowledge of individual forecasts, but only that
of the aggregate forecast.
· An approximate equilibrium (ε-Nash equilibrium) in the N -player setting may be
constructed from the MFG solution. In other words, an agent trading in the N -
agent market may construct a strategy whose gain is sufficiently close to the optimal
equilibrium gain in the full information setting using the mean-field game solution,
which does not require the knowledge of the private forecasts of the other agents.
To address these questions we need to make more precise assumptions on the proba-
bilistic setup of the problem. In particular, since we would like to study the convergence of
the N -agent problem as N →∞, we consider an infinity of agents. In addition all N -agent
problems and the mean field problem must be defined on the same probability space.
Assumption 8.
· The process S is square integrable and adapted to the filtration F0.
· The processes (Xi)∞i=1 are square integrable F-martingales.
· There exists a square intergrable F-martingale X, such that for all i ≥ 1, and all
t ∈ [0, T ], almost surely, E[Xit |F0t ] = Xt.
· The processes (Xˇi)∞i=1 defined by Xˇit = Xit −Xt for t ∈ [0, T ], are orthogonal square
integrable F-martingales, such that the expectation E[(XˇiT )2] does not depend on i.
Let us fix N < ∞, and consider a market with N agents. For a given i ≤ N , we may
define the "mean-field" strategy for the ith agent as follows.
φMF,i∗t = −It
+ λ
[
∆0,t
I˜0 +X0
1 + λ∆0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆s,t
dI˜s + dXs
1 + λ∆s,T
+∆˜0,t
Xˇi0
1 + λ∆˜0,T
+
∫ t
0
∆˜s,t
dXˇis
1 + λ∆˜s,T
]
. (24)
Unlike the true optimal strategy of the i-th agent, this strategy is computed using only the
common information and the individual information of the ith agent, it does not require
the knowledge of the private forecasts of the other agents. Moreover, this strategy does
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not depend on N . The following two results show that, on the one hand, the true optimal
strategy of the ith agent in the N -player game converges to this mean-field strategy as
N →∞, and on the other hand, that this mean-field strategy, if used by all agents in the
N -player game, constitutes an ε-Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 9. Let Assumption 8 hold true, and let φi∗ denote the optimal position of
the ith agent in the N -player complete information setting, given by (5), and by φMF,i∗
the optimal position in the mean field setting, given by (24). Then, for all N ≥ 1, the
differences between the strategy of a single agent, the aggregate strategy and the equilibrium
price in the N -agent model and the corresponding quantities in the mean-field model can
be bounded as follows.
sup
0≤t≤T
E[(φi∗t − φMF,i∗t )2] + sup
0≤t≤T
E[(φN∗t − φ∗t )2] + sup
0≤t≤T
E[(PNt − Pt)2]
≤ C
N2
∫ T
0
E[S2t ]dt+
C
N2
E[(XT )2] +
C
N
E[(XˇiT )2],
where the constant C depends only on the coefficients α, λ and a.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix 7.1.
Proposition 10. Under assumption 8, consider the vector of admissible strategies for
the N -player game defined by equation (24) for i = 1, . . . , N . Then, there is a constant
C <∞ which does not depend on N , such that for any other vector of admissible strategies
(φit)
i=1...,N
t∈[0,T ] for the N -player game,
JN,i(φi, φMF,−i∗)− C
N
1
2
≤ JN,i(φMF,i∗, φMF,−i∗), ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
In other words, the vector of strategies (φMF,i∗t )
i=1...,N
t∈[0,T ] is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the
N -player game with ε = C
N
1
2
.
Proof. To lighten notation, and since we now have only one strategy, we omit in this proof
the superscript MF in the candidate strategy φMF,i∗. The "distance to optimality" for this
strategy is estimated as follows.
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗)− JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗)
= JN,i(φi, φ−i∗)− JMF (φi, φ¯∗) + JMF (φi, φ¯∗)− JMF (φi∗, φ¯∗) + JMF (φi∗ , φ¯∗)
− JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗) ≤ JN,i(φi, φ−i∗)− JMF (φi, φ¯∗) + JMF (φi∗ , φ¯∗)− JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗).
The second difference is estimated via Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
JMF (φi
∗
, φ¯∗)− JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗) = aE
[∫ T
0
φ˙i∗t (φ¯
∗
t − φ¯N∗t )dt
]
≤ aE
[∫ T
0
(φ˙i∗t )
2dt
] 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(φ¯∗t − φ¯N∗t )2dt
] 1
2
, (25)
where
E
[∫ T
0
(φ¯∗t − φ¯N∗t )2dt
]
≤ 1
N2
N∑
i=1
E[(XˇiT )2] =
1
N
E[(Xˇ1T )2]. (26)
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The first difference admits the following estimate.
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗)− JMF (φi, φ¯∗) = aE
[∫ T
0
φ˙it(φ¯
∗
t − φ¯N∗t )dt
]
− a
N
E
[∫ T
0
φ˙it(φ
i
t − φi∗t )dt
]
≤ aE
[∫ T
0
(φ˙it)
2dt
] 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(φ¯∗t − φ¯N∗t )2dt
] 1
2
+
1
N
E
[∫ T
0
(φi∗t )
2dt
] 1
2
 .
(27)
On the other hand, the following estimate also holds true.
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗) ≤ −E
[
α¯
2
∫ T
0
(φ˙it)
2 + φ˙it
(
St + aφ¯
N∗
t +
a
N
(φit − φi∗t )
)
dt+
λ
2
(φiT −XT )2
]
≤ − α¯
2
E
[∫ T
0
(φ˙it)
2dt
]
+ CE
[∫ T
0
(φ˙it)
2dt
] 1
2
(28)
where
C = E
[∫ T
0
(St + aφ¯
N∗
t −
a
N
φi∗t )
2dt
] 1
2
and α¯ = min
0≤t≤T
α(t).
Let K := JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗) and A := max
{(
4C
α
)2
, 4|K|α¯
}
.
There are two cases. If
E
[∫ T
0
(φ˙it)
2dt
]
≤ A,
then from (25), (26) and (27), it follows that
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗)− JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗) ≤ a
N
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(φ˙i∗t )
2dt
] 1
2
E
[
(Xˇ1T )
2
] 1
2
+ aA
1
2
 1N 12 E [(Xˇ1T )2] 12 + 1N E
[∫ T
0
(φi∗t )
2dt
] 1
2
 . (29)
If the opposite inequality holds then from (28) it follows that
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗) ≤ JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗).
Thus, the estimate (29) holds for every admissible strategy φi. Moreover, φi∗ does not
depend on N , and in view of (25) and (26), A can be bounded from above by a constant
which also does not depend on N . Thus,
JN,i(φi, φ−i∗)− JN,i(φi∗, φ−i∗) ≤ C
N
1
2
,
for a constant C which does not depend on N .
6 Numerical illustration
In this section our objective is to analyze the empirically observed features of intraday
market prices, demonstrate that these features are reproduced by our model, and illustrate
other properties of our model, such as the convergence of the N -agent model to the mean-
field limit, with numerical examples.
In the rest of this section, we assume that the position taken by every agent in the
day-ahead market is exactly equal to the best estimate of the future demand computed at
time t = 0. Therefore, the initial values Xi0, i = 0, . . . , N will be set to 0.
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6.1 Stylized features of intraday electricity market prices
A brief description of the intraday electricity market and of our dataset The
EPEX intraday electricity market (www.epex.com) opens every day at 3 p.m and allows to
trade all delivery hours of the following day up to 5 minutes before delivery. Each delivery
hour is a distinct product in the market. Different European geographic zones are available
and in this study we focus on the German area. It is also possible to trade in quater-hours,
but in the empirical study we focus on the full hours only.
To compute the empirical price analyzed in the following sections we used the limit
order book data provided by EPEX for the 1st quarter of 2015 and January 2017. This
dataset contains full information about sell and buy orders recorded on any given day,
whether they result in a transaction or not. From this data we reconstruct the state of the
order book, which allows us in turn to derive the mid-quote price and the bid-ask spread.
Market liquidity In Figure 1, we plot the distribution of the number of orders and
transactions as function of time to delivery computed over all orders and transactions
in February 2015. We observe that the liquidity starts to appear only 5-6 hours before
delivery, and grows very quickly at the approach of the delivery date. This is consistent
with the assumption that the market is used by the renewable energy producers to adjust
their positions when precise forecasts become available.
Figure 1: Distribution of orders and transactions as function of the time to delivery over
February 2015
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Price volatility To estimate the empirical volatility, we consider mid-quote prices re-
constructed from the limit order book data of the Germany delivery zone for January 2017,
as explained above. The mid-quote price was computed on a uniform grid with a time step
of 1 minute. In January 2017 the market was already relatively liquid: the average number
of daily price changes for a given delivery hour varied between approximately 3400 for
the least liquid delivery hour (2AM) to approximately 5800 for the most liquid delivery
hour (6PM). Given that, as we observed above, liquidity is concentrated in the last 5-6
hours, a one-minute interval during this time contains many price changes and the market
microstructure effects are limited.
The observed midquote price is denoted (P˜t)t∈[0,T ]. For the purpose of estimating
volatility, we assume it has the following dynamics:
dP˜t = µtdt+ σtdW
P˜
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (30)
20
where (W P˜t )t∈[0,T ] is a Brownian motion, and (µt)t∈[0,T ] and (σt)t∈[0,T ] are adapted pro-
cesses. We denote by n the number of observations in the data of January 2017 and by
{t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn} the (uniform) time grid over which the observations are available. In
contrast with the integrated volatility whose estimator is generally given by ̂
∫ T
0 σ
2
sds =∑n
i=1 ∆P˜
2
ti−1 , estimating the instantaneous volatility is less straightforward. Following
[20], we use a kernel-based non parametric estimator of the instantaneous volatility:
σˆ2t =
∑n
i=1Kh(ti−1 − t)∆P˜ 2ti−1∑n
i=1Kh(ti−1 − t)(ti − ti−1)
, (31)
where K(.) is the Epanechnikov kernel: K(x) = 34(1− x2)1[−1,1](x) and Kh(x) = 1hK(xh).
The parameter h was taken equal to 0.08 hour (≈ 5 minutes) after performing some cross-
validation analyses and sensitivity tests. The paths of the estimated volatility as function
of time to delivery for different delivery hours are given in Figure 2. We observe that
the volatility increases as delivery time draws near and market participants trade more
actively.
Figure 2: Instantaneous market volatility for different delivery hours
Correlation between price and renewable indeed forecasts We finally study the
empirical correlation between the intraday market prices and the renewable wind produc-
tion forecasts. Contrary to the rest of the paper, here we use actual wind infeed forecasts,
not the demand forecasts. To compute empirical correlation estimates, we use the limit
order book data from the intraday EPEX market of the first three months of 2015 for the
Germany delivery zone, from which, as before, we compute the mid-quote prices. The pro-
duction forecasts correspond to the same period and are updated every 15 minutes for each
delivery hour. In Figure 3, we plot the correlation between the increments of the market
price and the increments of the production forecasts for the delivery time 12h (averaged
over 90 days in the dataset), together with the 2-standard deviation bounds. To match
the forecast update frequency, the mid-quote price is also sampled at 15-minute intervals
here.
We find that the correlation between the price increments and those of the production
forecast is negative and increases in absolute value as we approach the delivery time.
6.2 Numerical illustration of our model
Model specification We now define the dynamics for the fundamental price and for the
demand forecasts used in the simulations. We also give the chosen values of the different
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Figure 3: Correlation between the market price increments and the renewable production
forecast increments for the German delivery zone in winter 2015
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parameters. Our objective here is to illustrate the features of the model and show that it
reproduces the stylized facts of the market prices. Therefore the majority of the parameters
are not precisely estimated, but are given plausible values.
The evolution of the fundamental price is described as follows:
dSt = σSdWt (32)
where σS is a constant and (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is Brownian motion. We also assume that the
liquidity function α(.) is given by
α(t) = α× (T − t) + β, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (33)
where α and β are strictly positive constants. The liquidity function is decreasing with
time. This assumption relies on the fact that, as we observed in Section 6.1, the market
becomes more liquid as we get closer to the delivery time and it is less costly to trade when
the market is liquid.
To simulate demand forecasts we assume the following dynamics:
dX¯Nt = σXdB¯t (34)
dXˇit = σˇXdB
i
t, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (35)
where σX and σˇX are constants and (B¯t)t∈[0,T ], (Bit)t∈[0,T ] are independent Brownian
motions, also independent from (Wt)t∈[0,T ].
In this illustration, we choose the same parameters for the dynamics of the common and
the individual demand forecasts (that is, σX = σˇX). The common volatility is calibrated
to wind energy forecasts in Germany over January 2015 during the last quotation hour, by
using the classical volatility estimator
σX = σˇX =
√
∆t
n′ − 1
n′∑
i=1
Y 2i (36)
with ∆t the time step between two observations, Yi = Xti −Xti−1 the increment between
two successive observations and n′ the total number of observed increments. As the fore-
casts are updated every 15 minutes, there are three increments during the last trading
hour, available on each day from the 3rd of January to the 31th of January. Thus, for
each delivery hour we dispose of n′ = 87 increments points to estimate the volatility. The
volatility, as well as the other model parameters are specified in Table 1.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
S0 40 e/MWh a 1 e/MWh2
σS 10 e/MWh·h1/2 λ 100 e/MWh2
X0 0 MWh N 100
σX ,σˇX 73 MWh/h1/2 α 0.3 e/MW2·h
Xˇi0 0 MWh β 0.1 e/MW2
Table 1: Parameters of the model
Price trajectories. In Figure 4, we plot a simulated trajectory of the fundamental price
S starting six hours before the delivery time (corresponding to t = 0), up to the time T
of delivery, together with the market price P associated with the different settings studied
in this paper: the N -player Nash equilibrium with N = 100 players, the mean field and
the -Nash equilibrium. Graphs were all simulated with the same demand forecasts, initial
values, volatilities and parameters as specified in Table 1.
Figure 4: Model price trajectories (left) associated to a given common demand forecast
trajectory (right) in different settings
In all settings, the model reflects the price impact of the positions taken by the agents.
This price impact is influenced by the market price and the demand forecasts. If agents
anticipate to have overestimated the demand (negative values of the demand process),
there is an excess of supply in the market, thus the price impact is negative and the
market price decreases. On the contrary, if they anticipate to have underestimated the
demand (positive values of the demand forecast process), there is a lack of supply and the
market price increases.
Volatility and correlation In this paragraph we compare the price volatility and the
correlation between price and renewable infeed forecasts in our model with the empirical
ones. We have already seen through theoretical analysis in section 3.1 that our model
reproduces the observed features of the volatility; the goal of this paragraph is to confirm
this using simulated prices. We once again highlight the fact that the market impact can
induce an increase in the price variations but no changes in the quadratic variation since
the price impact, though it is stochastic, has a finite quadratic variation. However, the
volatility estimated from discrete price observations, which is the only quantity relevant in
practice, does increase in our model, as we shall see below.
We focus on hourly products and on several different delivery hours: 2 a.m, 8 a.m, 12
p.m and 6 p.m to include both peak (high electricity demand) and off-peak (low electricity
demand) times. The volatility of the fundamental price S is assumed to be constant,
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(σS = 10 e/MWh·h1/2) to ensure that the observed volatility changes are only due to
the stochastic drift of the market price, i.e the aggregate trading rates of the agents. The
volatility of the production forecasts for the different delivery hours has been calibrated
using the estimator defined in (36) and is shown in Table 2.
Hour Volatility (MWh/h1/2)
2h00 67
8h00 81
12h00 73
18h00 73
Table 2: Calibrated volatility of the production forecast for different delivery hours
During peak hours, both market activity and liquidity are higher. To account for this
phenomenon in our model, we chose different levels of the liquidity coefficients α and β
defined in (33) and presented in Table 3. Since calibrating the model to market data is
Hours
Coefficients
α (e/h.MW2) β (e/MW2)
2h00 1.2 0.5
8h00 0.5 0.2
12h00 0.7 0.3
18h00 0.3 0.1
Table 3: Liquidity coefficients used for different delivery hours
not the purpose of this study, we chose plausible values for these coefficients in an ad hoc
manner with lower trading costs corresponding to delivery hours for which the market is
more liquid. All other model parameters are specified in Table 1.
Figure 5 shows the estimated volatility of the simulated model price P in the Nash
N -player game setting with N = 100, averaged over 1000 simulations. The volatility was
computed using the estimator (31), with the same window width and time step as in the
empirical analysis. From this graph we can see that the model is able to reproduce the
increasing shape of the empirical market price volatility at the approach of the delivery
time, and that it captures the different levels of volatility corresponding to the different
delivery hours.
Figure 5: Simulated model volatility for different delivery hours
Correlation between price and renewable infeed An important stylized feature of
intraday market prices, observed empirically in [19] is the correlation between the price
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and the renewable production forecasts. Figure 6 plots the correlation between 15-minute
increments of the simulated market price and the 15-minute increments of the simulated
renewable production forecasts as function of time. For each time step, the correlation
ρt = corr(∆Yt,∆Pt) is computed by Monte Carlo using the following estimator:
ρˆt =
∑Nsim
k=1 (∆Y
k
t −∆Y t)(∆P kt −∆P t)√∑Nsim
k=1 (∆Y
k
t −∆Y t)2
∑Nsim
k=1 (∆P
k
t −∆P t)2
,
with Nsim stands for number of simulations (we considered Nsim = 50000), ∆Y kt =
−(XN,kt+dt −XN,kt ), ∆P kt = PN,kt+dt − PN,kt and N = 100. Notice that we use the minus sign
in front of the forecast increment to plot the correlation of production forecasts, whereas
X stands for the demand forecast.
Figure 6: Correlation between the simulated market price increments and the renewable
production forecast increments in the model during the last six hours of trading
We first note that the correlation is negative: an expected increase of the renewable
production is correlated to a decrease in the market price and an expected lack of renewable
production is correlated to an increase in the price. As we get closer to the delivery
date, the agents trade more actively as new forecast information becomes available, and
the market price becomes more strongly dependent on the forecast updates. The model
outputs qualitatively match the results observed empirically. However, the strength of the
correlation seems to be greater in the model than in reality. This can be explained by
the fact that the model does not take into account other renewable means of production
such as the solar energy. The slight increase of the correlation for longer times to delivery
(the right-hand side of the graph) may be explained by the fact that the correlation is
computed as the ratio of the covariance to the square root of the product of variances.
While both quantities decrease for longer times to delivery, the denominator may decrease
faster, explaining the slight increase in the correlation values.
Convergence and approximations In Figure 7 we plot the mean field position, the
aggregate N -player Nash equilibrium position and the aggregate position for the -Nash
equilibrium (respectively given by Theorem 3, Theorem 7 and Proposition 10) for a model
with N = 5 players and N = 100 players. The trajectories were computed with the same
simulated fundamental price, common production forecast and parameters as the Figure
4 above, over the 6 hours preceding the delivery time. The left graph (N = 5) shows
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a big difference between the Nash equilibrium and -Nash approximation on one hand,
and the mean field on the other hand. This is explained by the individual production
forecast taken into account in the Nash and -Nash equilibria. When we consider a larger
number of players, N = 100, the three position trajectories are much closer to each other.
This confirms the asymptotic convergence to the mean field discussed in section 5 for the
N -player Nash equilibrium and -Nash equilibrium.
Figure 7: Aggregate position in different settings with N = 5 (left) and N = 100 (right)
agents
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. For all t ∈ [0, T ], we define:
gNs,t =
∆Ns,t
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆
N
s,T )
, gs,t =
∆s,t
(1 + λ∆s,T )
,
g˜Ns,t =
∆˜Ns,t
(1 + ( aN + λ)∆˜
N
s,T )
, g˜s,t =
∆˜s,t
(1 + λ∆˜s,T )
,
so that, for some constant C depending only on the parameters a, α and λ, but not on
other ingredients of the model,
|gNs,t − gs,t|+ |g˜Ns,t − g˜s,t| ≤
C
N
.
Now, let us consider the optimal strategies (φi∗t )t∈[0,T ] and (φ
MF,i∗
t )t∈[0,T ] of the generic
agent i respectively in the N -player setting and the mean field setting. Fix t ∈ [0, T ].
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Then,
φi∗t − φMF,i∗t = −INt + It + gN0,t
{( a
N
+ λ
)
I˜N0 + λX
N
0
}
− λgt(0)(I˜0 +X0)
+
∫ t
0
gNs,t
{( a
N
+ λ
)
dI˜Ns + λdX
N
s
}
− λ
∫ t
0
gt(s)(dI˜s + dXs)
+
∫ t
0
λg˜Ns,td(X
i
s −XNs ) + λg˜N0,t(Xi0 −XN0 )− λ
[
g˜0,t(X
i
0 −X0) +
∫ t
0
g˜s,td(X
i
s −Xs)
]
= It − INt +
{
gN0,t
( a
N
+ λ
)
− λg0,t
}
I˜N0 + λg0,t(I˜
N
0 − I˜0)
+
∫ t
0
{
gNs,t
( a
N
+ λ
)
− λgs,t
}
dI˜Ns +
∫ t
0
λgs,td(I˜
N
s − I˜s)
+ λ
{
gN0,t − g0,t
}
X
N
0 + λg0,t(X
N
0 −X0) +
∫ t
0
λ
{
gNs,t − gs,t
}
dX
N
s +
∫ t
0
λgs,td(X
N
s −Xs)
+ λ(g˜N0,t − g˜0,t)Xi0 − λ(g˜N0,t − g˜0,t)XN0 + λg˜0,t(X0 −XN0 )
+ λ
∫ t
0
(g˜Ns,t − g˜0,t)dXis − λ
∫ t
0
(g˜Ns,t − g˜s,t)dXNs + λ
∫ t
0
g˜s,td(Xs −XNs )
Therefore, for some constant C depending only on the parameters a, α and λ, but not on
other ingredients of the model,
E[(φi∗t − φMF,i∗t )2] ≤ E[(INt − It)2] +
C
N2
E[(I˜Nt )2] + CE[(I˜Nt − I˜t)2]
+
C
N2
E[(XNt )2] + CE[(X
N
t −Xt)2] +
C
N2
E[(Xit)2]
≤ E[(INt − It)2] +
C
N2
E[(INT )2] + CE[(INT − IT )2] +
C
N2
E[(Xt)2]
+
C
N2
N∑
i=1
E[(Xˇit)2] ≤
C
N2
∫ T
0
E[S2t ]dt+
C
N2
E[(Xt)2] +
C
N
E[(Xˇit)2].
where the estimate for the first line above is obtained through Jensen’s inequality. The
other two estimates of the proposition are obtained in a similar way.
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